Cloud computing providers are under great pressure to reduce operational costs through improved energy utilization while provisioning dependable service to customers; it is therefore extremely important to understand and quantify the explicit impact of failures within a system in terms of energy costs. This paper presents the first comprehensive analysis of the impact of failures on energy consumption in a realworld large-scale cloud system (comprising over 12 500 servers), including the study of failure and energy trends of the spatial and temporal environmental characteristics. Our results show that 88% of task failure events occur in lower priority tasks producing 13% of total energy waste, and 1% of failure events occur in higher priority tasks due to server failures producing 8% of total energy waste. These results highlight an unintuitive but significant impact on energy consumption due to failures, providing a strong foundation for research into dependable energy-aware cloud computing.
Dependability research is greatly enhanced by analysis of failures within real-world systems, as researchers and practitioners are able to develop and tune highly effective dependability mechanisms based on realistic empirical data for a given domain. Such analyses are particularly crucial for the development of the energy-aware dependability mechanisms that are increasingly required in modern large-scale systems, particularly in the Cloud computing industry.
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [1] , Cloud Computing is ''a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction''. In such environments, practitioners are under great pressure to ensure Quality of Service (QoS) levels agreed with customers are fulfilled whilst reducing operational cost to maximize profit [2] , [3] . A substantial amount of this operational cost is energy waste [4] , and a significant amount of this energy waste is produced by failures due to software and hardware crashes [5] , [6] . Important work has been developed in power/energy modeling of large systems such as those presented by [7] , [8] . Additionally, a significant number of resource management techniques such as [9] , [10] have been proposed to reduce such energy waste while maintaining the expected performance levels. However, these approaches have relegated the impact of software and hardware crashes on the energy-efficiency of the analyzed systems. In this context we define software and hardware crashes as a fail-stop failure, i.e. processes or hardware fail by stopping without doing anything, and energy waste as the amount of energy expended on computational work that is lost due to failures. Crash failures result in a loss of work and require computation to be repeated after recovery, thus any energy used prior to and including recovery is in fact wasted in comparison with failure-free execution. As mentioned in [11] and [12] , another factor that increases resource waste in systems is the amount of rolled-back computation after failure.
Recent theoretical analyses and studies have highlighted failures as a source of inefficiencies that increment energy consumption in large-scale datacenters, and have proposed a number of mechanisms to reduce energy waste including resource selection [6] , rollback [11] and resource scheduling [13] . Unfortunately, all of these analyses are derived from theoretical data and provide no insight about the true characteristics and dimensions of energy waste caused by failures.
On the other hand, current failure analyses of large-scale systems, limited due to confidentiality concerns, focus on analyzing failure statistics in terms of Time Between Failures [14] , [15] , root cause failure [16] , [17] of systems, and performance implications. However, all of these practical analyses neglect quantifying the impact of failures in terms of energy. The gap between these two strands of (theoretical and practical) work emphasizes the urgent need for failure analyses that consider the impact of failures on energy consumption.
Analyzing the impact of failures on energy consumption is critical for two main reasons. Firstly, it enables researchers and practitioners to understand the characteristics and dimensions of the problem in order to create concrete scenarios for decision-making. For example, in order to know what dependability mechanisms to use and when to apply them effectively, datacenter administrators require awareness about the variables and conditions under which waste is produced. Secondly, it is important for practitioners (e.g. Cloud service providers) to understand the impact that both task and server failures have on datacenter energy waste and operational efficiency.
In this context, we define a task as a program, possibly consisting of multiple processes running on a single machine assigned and performed within the Cloud. A server is defined as the hardware as well as the system software managing the hardware e.g. OS, software supporting communications, and networking. This understanding allows Cloud service providers to create a baseline and points of improvement to reduce the energy waste as long as the QoS offered to the customers is maintained. The major contributions of this paper are:
• The first empirical task and server failure analysis of a large-scale heterogeneous Cloud computing environment that considers the impact of failures on energy waste.
• Quantification of energy waste produced by tasks and server failures within a large-scale system to support and boost the application of current theoretical models for energy savings under specific conditions. The analysis is performed on the Google Cloud trace log which consists of over 12,500 servers over the period of 29 days containing over 25 million submitted tasks. In order to determine the impact of failures, we characterize all events that result in incomplete task termination in terms of elapsed time, server host, event type, and priority. We then further filter these events to identify task and server failures based on meaningful observations from the dataset and supporting literature, including the trace log specification. Finally, we conduct failure analysis of the temporal and spatial characteristics of tasks and servers, considering energy waste based on realistic energy models.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses related work; Section 3 introduces the dataset and coarsegrain analysis of the trace log; Section 4 discusses the methodology used; Section 5 presents the analysis of Termination Events; Section 6 shows the general statistics of the failure-analysis; Section 7 and 8 present and discuss the temporal and spatial analysis of the failure characteristics and the resulting energy waste; Section 9 describes the impact of energy waste due to failures within the system environment; Section 10 discusses the application of this work and Section 11 concludes the paper and outlines future research.
II. RELATED WORK
The importance of failure analysis and their impact on largescale computing environments has been highlighted and partially addressed in previous work. Furthermore, the impact of failures on the waste of resources and increasing energy consumption has been identified as a critical factor and has been approached from different perspectives. This section introduces the most relevant works in both areas.
Schroeder, et al. [15] analyze the failure data of 29 different systems over the period of 9 years. They present the MTBF and MTTR of nodes as well as root cause of failures. Their results indicate that average failure rates vary across systems significantly, that there exists a correlation between machine failure rate and workload intensity and that time between failures and repair times are well modeled by Weibull and lognormal distributions, respectively.
Liang, et al. [18] present a study of the collected RAS (Reliability, Availability, and Serviceability) event logs from BlueGene/L over a period of more than 100 days. The objective is to investigate and characterize the failure events as well as the correlation between fatal and non-fatal events to minimize the negative impact of system performance.
Hui, et al. [19] analyze job failures in a large-scale dataintensive Grid composed of 180 active sites and 34,121 servers over three time periods totaling 24 days. The objective is to characterize the interval times and life spans of failed jobs looking for cross-correlation structures and statistical models to fit the failure data and measure its impact on system performance.
Ropars, et al. [11] highlight the amount of resources wasted with respect to computing power or energy due to computation rolled-back after failures. The main objective of this work is the design of hierarchical rollback-recovery protocols based on a combination of coordinated checkpointing and message logging to reduce the waste produced by redundant computation.
Nguyen, et al. [6] discuss the inefficiencies and increment of energy consumption due to failures in large-scale datacenters. Authors approach this energy waste problem by proposing a resource selection scheme to reduce the number of tasks re-submissions that result from failures during their life cycle.
Quiane-Ruiz, et al. [13] discuss the wasted resources and performance impact caused by task failures in MapReduce environments due to automatic re-scheduling. The main objective is to reduce the need for re-executing completed map tasks by re-computing only intermediate data that were processed by local reducers and hence does not require VOLUME 2, NO. 2, JUNE 2014 moving to another node for processing using fast tracking algorithms.
From the literature review and the current state of the art it is observable that there is a clear gap between failure analysis approaches and the design of mechanisms to reduce the energy waste caused by failures. On the one hand, the analyses are completely focused on how the failure characteristics are correlated to performance drawbacks and completely neglect the impact of those failures on the energy waste. On the other hand, theoretical approaches emphasize the importance of reducing the waste produced by failures without providing any insight about the characteristics and dimensions of the addressed problem. As a result, this creates the requirement for comprehensive failure analyses that also include the energy impact in real production environments.
III. DATASET

A. DATASET DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS INFRASTRUCTURE
The Google tracelog features 12,532 individual servers, spanning 29 days of operation, and includes over 48 million task submissions. Furthermore, the trace provides normalized CPU, Memory and disk utilization per task every 5 minutes. The trace log is available at [20] , and information about the data schema and normalization process can be found in [21] . Due to the large volume and unprocessed nature of the data within the trace log (approximately 400GB of Comma Separated Files), it was necessary to deploy a 50 node Hadoop MapReduce [22] cluster running HIVE [23] , a data warehouse system, for storage and query computation. This allowed us to extrapolate data from the trace log in a timely manner (reducing individual query times from approximately 6 days to 15 minutes), as well as conduct event filtering and energy profiling of servers and tasks as described in Section 4. Table 1 depicts the general statistical properties of the trace log as well as the workload of the datacenter. Workload is defined as the specific amount of work computed or processed in the datacenter with defined resource requirements and consumption patterns. The overall workload in a datacenter is commonly shaped by user submission patterns, task characteristics and scheduling policies. In the analyzed trace log, the workload is created by 930 different users submitting 650,000 different jobs comprising just over 25 million tasks. According to [21] , a task in the system is represented as a Linux program consisting of one or more processes that can be encapsulated within a job. In this study, we focus on tasks in order to achieve fine granularity, and observe that there are over 47 million tasks scheduled; this is due to the possibility that a submitted task can be rescheduled multiple times. Furthermore, there are 144,000,000 and 38,000 recorded events corresponding to tasks and servers, respectively.
B. COARSE-GRAIN ANALYSIS
Users have different submission patterns ranging from a single task to 3.5 million tasks over the trace log timespan. From Fig. 1(a) , it can be seen that almost 94% of the users submit a small proportion of the total tasks within the Cloud environment, whilst the remaining 6% of users are responsible for the generation of the heavy workload due to their larger submission rate. In addition, Fig. 1 (c) depicts the variability of task submission per day over the trace log time period, ranging from 678,929 to 4,940,423 tasks submitted daily.
Each submitted task consumes CPU, memory and disk space at different rates and durations and are presented as normalized values within the trace log. All values of resource consumption are normalized based on the largest server capacity within the trace log. As observed in Fig. 1(b) , approximately 98% of tasks incur small to moderate resource consumption while only 2% incur large resource demands. Furthermore, the proportion of resource consumption is strongly correlated to the duration of the task. Therefore, short tasks consume on average a smaller amount of resources in comparison to long tasks. The sum of the diverse utilization patterns and the placement constraints create a highly heterogeneous workload environment typical of multitenant Cloud datacenters.
The scheduling policy of the system is mainly based on task priorities. The priority scale for tasks ranges from 0 to 11 to indicate the lowest and highest priority, respectively. When required, low-priority tasks are evicted to yield resources to high-priority tasks creating further re-submission events that have a high impact on the overall workload. Fig. 1(d) illustrates the distribution of task priorities in the analyzed datacenter, where it can be observed that lower priorities (0-8) represent the 99% of the total submitted tasks, with higher or production priorities (9-11) accounting for the remaining 1% approximately.
C. EVENT LOGS
As depicted in Table 1 , there is a large volume of events captured within the trace log which are divided into two separate event logs; ''server events'' and ''task events''. An event is defined as an action that changes the state of a task or server in a specific time and place. The data logged for a server event includes the Server Identifier, attributes of the server, the time of event occurrence and the event type. There are three possible event types for servers: A server is made available to the system environment (ADD), the server is removed from the cluster due to a failure or maintenance (REMOVE) and the available resources of a specific server are modified (UPDATE).
Likewise, the task event log contains entries shared in the server event log, such as a task identifier, time of occurrence and event type, as well as additional attributes, such as the Server Identifier where the task was allocated as well as the task owner. Further information about the event attributes can be found in [21] . During their life cycle, tasks can pass through four different states: Pending, Running, Complete and Dead which are driven by a set of events that includes task submissions and re-submissions, successful task completion, failures, evictions, and killings among others described by [21] and presented in Fig. 2 . A task will be assigned Pending status when it is waiting to be allocated after being initially submitted by the user and re-submitted by the task scheduler. Once the scheduler finds a suitable server to allocate the task and it is deployed, the status is changed to Running. When a task successful finishes execution it transitions to Complete status. An individual task can only be running within a single server at any time. In addition, it is possible for a task to be rescheduled to another server.
According to the trace log specification [21] , there are three events that can move the state of a task to Dead without successful completion, from this point we refer to these events as ''Termination Events'' (TEs). First, it is possible for a task to be evicted from a server (EVICT) due to over commitment of the scheduler, the server on which the task is being executed becomes unstable or the disk holding the data of the task fails. Second, it is possible for a task to be terminated due to a task software crash (FAIL). Lastly, a task can be cancelled due to the user, loss of dependencies with other tasks or unknown causes of termination (KILL). If any of the above three events occur, the task is automatically re-submitted and returns to Pending status.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The main objective of this paper is to outline and quantify the impact of failures (tasks and servers) in terms of energy waste within the analyzed trace log. This section describes the methodology of analysis which is shaped by three main steps: event sampling, failure event identification, and failureenergy impact analysis.
A. EVENT SAMPLING
In order to analyze the energy waste produced by TEs and failures, it was necessary to characterize the events in the trace log by event type, elapsed time, task priority, and server host. While the event type, priority and server host are explicitly provided in the trace log, the elapsed time needs to be calculated based on the registered timestamps in the task event log. We refer to elapsed time as the period of time between a VOLUME 2, NO. 2, JUNE 2014 task being scheduled and the occurrence of a TE. The elapsed time is calculated by subtracting the latest ''schedule'' event timestamp from the TE timestamp. The sample for the analysis presented in this paper considers all the TEs except those that have trunked elapsed time i.e. all tasks that have ''schedule'' events that occur before the trace log span. This condition mainly excludes the monitoring services running in the Cloud grouped in priorities 10 and 11 which have started running prior to the start of the trace log observation period. The principal reason for this exclusion is that these events do not allow the calculation of realistic energy consumption and can considerably skew the results. As a result, the sample consists of 25,927,826 TEs that represent 87% of the total TEs recorded in the trace log.
B. FAILURE EVENT IDENTIFICATION
Due to the ambiguous definition and utilization of the different TEs, it is impossible to identify all the failures solely from the previous characterized sample. Therefore, it has been necessary to create a set of assumptions -supported by relevant literature and the evidence of system behavior derived from data in the trace log -to distinguish failure events apart from TEs. Using this approach, we have been able to filter the event logs to identify two types of failures as shown in Table 2 . Server failures are characterized as a software or hardware crash failure; based on the observations of the data, when a server failure occurs, all tasks executing on the server are subsequently terminated. As mentioned in [21] , a REMOVE event for a server is the result of either a server failure or maintenance. Due to this ambiguity, it is not possible to distinguish server failure from planned server maintenance, as postulated within [24] . However, data observations shows that almost all REMOVE events are initiated with a number of tasks still running on the server. As a result, we classify all REMOVE events as server failures (agnostic of maintenance), as this event results in tasks deviating from correct service. Task failures are characterized as software crash failures. Task failures filtered from the task event log are identified by tasks that exhibit the FAIL event. In [21] , FAIL events have been explicitly defined as the result of a software crash of the task.
In addition, we have also filtered the task event log to identify TEs due to server failures. These tasks are of importance to this work to enable studying of the energy impact of failures within the trace log. This filter was applied to tasks that were descheduled by KILL, EVICT or FAIL events whose timestamp resided within the calculated time period of server downtime.
It has been well understood that the root causes of task and server failures might be physical, design (typically software), human-machine interaction faults, or even malicious attacks, or a combination of them [25] . In reality, transient hardware faults, hardware design faults and software bugs often cause similar system behaviour [26] . Within this work, we decided not to distinguish the root cause of a failure for servers due to ambiguity within the trace log. However, we are able to filter tasks failures that are resultant of hardware or software crashes within servers and software crashes within a task.
C. ENERGY ANALYSIS
The energy consumption per TE is calculated based on the power profile of the server where the tasks were running and the average CPU load imposed by tasks involved. Servers within the trace log are heterogeneous in nature and are aggregated in 3 main platforms which each contain a different combination of micro-architecture, chipset version, and CPU capacity. Each platform has one or more configurations that are merely variations of memory capacity.
As observed in Table 3 precise details of servers and their platforms are masked in the trace log. Consequently, the characteristics and power profiles of real systems are considered from the results of SpecPower2008 benchmark [27] . The actual architectural characteristics and power profiles of Google servers may vary from those presented in the SpecPower2008 results, therefore the best assumption that can be performed is matching the profiles of realistic datacenter servers based on the CPU and memory capacity presented in the trace log. Namely, the selection of the specific profiles is based on the proportional similarity between obfuscated server capacities of CPU and Memory in the trace log and the actual server configurations provided in the SpecPower2008 results. This enables us to obtain energy calculations proportionally close to those that could be measured directly from the actual Google cluster.
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For example, ProLiant platform has approximately 25% of the CPU and memory of the PRIMERGY platform which is the same as Platform A that has 25% of CPU and memory capacity of Platform B in the trace log. The same case applies between 1022G-NTF platform and PRIMERGY in relation to the proportion of the obfuscated platforms B and C as presented in Table 3 . The profiles presented by SpecPower2008 are preferred over other available server benchmarks because the results are obtained following a strict methodology of experimentation and monitoring, which is presented in [27] .
According to [28] [29] [30] , in comparison to other resources, CPU consumes the largest amount of the total power demand in physical servers. Therefore, it is assumed that all the configurations from the same platform share the same power profile as they share the same CPU micro-architecture and capacity. Each platform has a unique power profile that consists of 10 measurements ranging from 0% to 100% of system utilization with increments of 10% and their correspondent power consumption. While the system utilization is measured in terms of computed Server Side Java Operations (ssjops), power is measured in watts. The power models of the 3 selected platforms are presented in Fig. 3 .
These empirical models allow us to approximate the energy E consumed by specific tasks considering their power usage during the period of time t of execution (elapsed time). The power usage P of a task with CPU consumption u is estimated by applying linear interpolation between two known measurements α and β. α is the lower measurement with utilization u α and power consumption P(u α ), and β is the upper measurement with utilization u β and power consumption P(u β ). An example of this would be to determine the power consumption of system load at 25% between the power measurements 20% and 30% for a server platform. The formalization of these concepts is presented in Equations 1 to 3.
With the energy calculated per event, the statistical analysis is conducted in two dimensions: First, we analyze the frequency and distribution of events per day to determine how the intensity of specific event type occurrence and their variation impact energy waste. Second, we analyze the elapsed time per event type and task priority to determine the contribution of each one to the total produced energy waste.
V. TERMINATION EVENTS ANALYSIS
From the trace log analysis in Fig. 4(a) it is observable that out of the sample of 25,927,826 TEs characterized, 52% events correspond to task failures while only 22% and 26% correspond to EVICT and KILL events, respectively. If we analyze the number of such events across the 29 days as presented in Fig. 4(b) , it is also observable that the total amount of task failures is inflated by events recorded during day 2 and VOLUME 2, NO. 2, JUNE 2014 day 10. The reason for this behavior is postulated in [24] as ''crash-loops'', where tasks deterministically fail shortly after starting, yet are configured to subsequently restart shortly after failing. In addition, the majority of task failures in this period are due to tasks failing multiple times, resulting in a significant increase in the scheduler workload.
However, when contrasting the proportion of energy waste generated by those events, KILL and EVICT contribute 48% and 39%, respectively while only 13% is produced by task failures as illustrated in Fig. 5(a) . This disparity between the number of events and energy waste for task FAIL events suggests that they mostly occur at a very early stage during the task execution, reducing the overall elapsed time. On the other hand, KILL and EVICT affect more long-lived tasks incrementing the energy wasted in relation to their number of occurrences. As presented in Fig. 5(b) , it is also noticeable that the daily waste produced by tasks that experience KILL and EVICT events is greater and less variable than that of FAIL events. This suggests that the most of KILL and EVICT events are caused by typical scheduler operational behavior while FAIL events are a result of abnormal system behavior.
VI. FAILURE ANALYSIS
The following two sections present the temporal and spatial characteristics of filtered FAIL events from the TEs and server REMOVE events to study the impact of energy wasted for tasks and server failures, respectively. Before presenting the subsequent failure analysis, it must be emphasized that each failure event for servers and tasks may not necessarily correspond to a unique failure, and that failure events that are temporally close together may be caused by the same failure. This vagueness is a result of the lack of precise data concerning failures, even after filtering failure events apart from TEs. However as stated in previous works [16] , [18] , [31] , it is incredibly difficult to identify the root cause as well as the duration of a failure.
Furthermore, it is possible that the total energy waste calculated for tasks and servers could potentially be reduced when considering checkpointing of tasks. However, when consulting the supporting literature of the trace log, as well as analyzing and characterizing task and resource utilization, we found no evidence of tasks exhibiting behavior of checkpointing. In addition, termination events result in work performed prior to termination to be lost. This behavior in a subset of tasks is supported in [13] and [22] which states that ''a task failure is an interruption on a running task, requiring the system to reexecute the interrupted task'', indicating that a failure results in a task being restarted from the beginning of execution. Finally, assigning theoretical checkpointing frequencies and overhead time to different task types would be subjective
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and arbitrary, distorting the behavior of tasks within the system. This also potentially leads to an additional increment in energy usage since some checkpointing mechanisms, such as memory or HDD logging, consume a considerable amount of energy as discussed in [32] and [33] . Table 4 depicts general statistics of the failure events within the trace log after filtering failure events from TEs as described in Section 4. It is observable from Table 4 that 3.26% and 39% of the total unique tasks and servers within the trace period experience one or more failures, respectively. This indicates that a relatively small number of unique tasks (3.26% of total tasks) account for a large amount (52%) of failures. This percentage of failure is comparable to other distributed systems studied in [19] and [34] , where 5-8% and 2.4% of jobs failed after a period of execution, respectively. 
VII. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS
A. TASKS
Fig. 6 depicts the number of failures events observed for tasks.
It is observed that both Day 2 and 10 experience a significant spike in task failure events, composing 44.2% of the total task failures events within the trace log due to crash-loops described previously. Furthermore, work in [18] states that there exists three large crash-loops within the trace log period with a duration from 30 minutes to 5 days. From filtering task failures apart from TEs, we observe that there exist two distinct crash-loops occurring from Days 2 and 10 and continuing for subsequent days. The majority of the task failure events occur on lower priority jobs, particularly in priority 0. As shown in Table 5 , priority 0 composes 80.99% of the total observable task failures, and we postulate the reason for this behavior is that the task is used for developmental configuration and testing, resulting in increased failures. In addition, it is observable that after the first crash-loop in Day 2, 97.2% of failed tasks in Day 3 are of production level priority 9.
FIGURE 6. Number of task failure events daily. Table 5 presents the MTBF for tasks by priority type. It is observed that there is a large variance between the MTBF of task priorities, reflecting the nature of the tasks i.e. Priority 8 and 9 are characterized by long running tasks, while priority 0 tasks are short in duration. We observe that priority 0 tasks on average fail just under 1 hour, which supports the notion that reported crash-loops deterministically fail shortly after being scheduled. Fig. 7(a) presents the distribution for MTBF of tasks, where it is observed that the distribution is positively skewed, indicating that a large proportion of tasks fail within a short amount of time after starting. Moreover, the MTBF for priority 0 tasks is significantly shorter than that of priority 9, and that these tasks experience the most frequent and largest proportion of multiple failures per task with 37.25% and 2.86% of total unique tasks experiencing 80.99% and 8.83% of the total failure events, respectively.
It is also observable from Table 5 that the MTTR of all tasks within the system are short, with the longest average recovery duration being just over 2 minutes and the shortest being just under 3 seconds. Fig. 7(b) presents the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for MTTR of all tasks, further demonstrating that the majority of tasks recover under a minute and best fits a Lognormal distribution. We also observe that the MTTR for a task becomes shorter as the priority of a task becomes higher and that the standard deviation for lower priority tasks is high. We postulate the reason for this behavior is that the MTTR for lower priority tasks could be inflated as a result of the scheduler; lower priority tasks have a longer scheduling time compared to tasks of higher priority resulting in longer queuing times before being rescheduled to a server.
These observations assist in outlining the failure characteristics of tasks; First, the short MTBF and MTTR for priority 0 tasks at 1 hour and 2 minutes, respectively indicate that simply restarting the task from a crash failure does not correct the failure. This may be a result of a fault at the task application level. The issue with this behavior is that the scheduler continues to submit failing tasks repeatedly into the system environment (there are extreme cases where a single task is submitted 40,290 times). For higher priority tasks, failures occur less frequently, and are corrected by simply restarting the task. Fig. 8 depicts the number of server failures categorized by server type over the trace period for server populations greater than 1% (representing 99.56% of the total server failures within the trace log). We observe that the average number failures per day is 309 with a standard deviation of 101. The proportion of failures per server type daily remains stable across all observed days, and that this proportion is strongly correlated with the total server population as well as the proportion of scheduled tasks as shown in Table 6 . This indicates that not one of the server types within the trace log fails more frequently than the others in proportion to their respective population. It is observable that the server MTBF is between 12.24 -13.04 hours per server type; this calculation is restricted due to the observational period of the trace log for server failure times. We observe that the MTBF per server type follows a Weibull distribution and exhibit similar failure behavior as shown in Fig. 9(a) .
B. SERVERS
We observe that the average MTTR per server type varies between 1.48 -9.17 hours, and that the CDF for system wide MTTR for servers best fits a Lognormal distribution when performing the Anderson-Darling test and is positively skewed as shown in Fig. 9(b) , demonstrating that the majority of servers recover within similar time periods, with 80% of all servers recovering within 1.4 hours. This observation follows previous work [15] which observe that recovery times follow a Lognormal distribution. As the majority of servers recover within short time frame, we postulate that the servers are restarted automatically after failure and service is corrected, while a small proportion of servers require further maintenance and repair, reflecting a MTTR between 24 hours up to 180 hours for more complicated failures. Fig. 10 presents the number of fail events and energy waste per priority level. It is noticeable that although 80% of FAIL events affect tasks with priority 0 producing close to 50% of the energy waste, there is a weak influence between the number of occurrences for this priority and the waste produced. Measured as 0.412 on the Pearson scale, this weak correlation between the number of occurrences and the total energy wasted per day reflects a significant variability in the MTBF produced by FAIL events. While the majority of tasks are short in terms of MTBF, there are a few large tasks that significantly affect the amount of energy waste.
C. TASK FAILURE ENERGY WASTE
Furthermore, we observe that priority 8 and 9 tasks proportionally waste a large amount of energy in comparison to the number of failures. This is a result of the failure characteristics of tasks; priority 8 and 9 tasks exhibit a large MTBF as shown in Table 5 , resulting in a larger amount of energy waste. 
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D. SERVER FAILURE ENERGY WASTE
The total number of TEs that occurred due to servers failed is 59,583 with 21% and 79% of the events corresponding to KILL and EVICT, respectively. As presented in Table 7 , this has a considerable impact on the energy waste that can be filtered from the total proportion of energy wasted as presented in Fig. 5 .
As observed in Table 7 , although the number of events in both cases represents less than 1% of the total number of events of each type, they produce significant amount of energy wasted in matters of 10.90% and 6.58% for EVICT and KILL, respectively. Additionally, we have also started to outline a difference from the waste produced by the ''normal'' environment operation and the waste produced by server failures. In a daily analysis presented in Fig. 11(a) , it can be observed that although the energy waste produced by server failures varies considerably, the proportion of EVICT and KILL events remains stable at approximately 60% and 40%, respectively from Day 6 onwards.
If we compare the energy waste produced due to server failures it is interesting to observe that it has an incremental tendency across the days as presented in Fig. 11(a) . This suggests that server failures affect a large number of long duration tasks. Therefore, the longer a task has been running the greater the impact that an eviction or killing has on the energy wasted.
In addition, when comparing the number of server failures and total energy waste, we observe that that there is a weaker correlation (0.579 on the Pearson scale). However, there appears to be a visual correlation between these two variables when examining the proportion of server types as shown in Figs. 8 and 11(b) . Statistically, server types 1, 7 and 10 exhibit a stronger correlation between 0.702-0.922 while server types 3 and 5 range between 0.268-0.431. Fig. 12 shows the distribution of tasks by priority level and their energy impact when servers fail. Here it is observed that when a server fails a considerable proportion (close to 30%) of failed tasks correspond to priority 9 which are effectively long running production tasks. This causes up to 65% of the total energy waste produced by server failures.
From these observations we can clearly depict a strong correlation between server failures and the termination of priority 9 tasks which causes an increasing energy waste across the analyzed days in the trace log. This correlation measured as 0.92 on the Pearson scale.
VIII. SPATIAL ANALYSIS
Next we present the spatial characteristics of failure events to analyze how failures are distributed across user-task VOLUME 2, NO. 2, JUNE 2014 ownership and servers. We observe that 10 users within the trace log contribute 91% of the total task failures within the entire trace log. It is interesting to notice that while 42% of task failure events occur in tasks owned by User 1, the total energy waste produced by this user is 2% as shown in Fig. 13 . We postulate that these users are the prime contributors towards the two crash-loops that occur within Days 2 and 10. Moreover, we observe that User 2 exhibits a greater amount of energy waste in comparison to User 1; This is due to User 2 submitting tasks of higher priority that execute for longer periods of time across different time periods of the system, while User 1 predominately submits priority 0 tasks within the crash-loop time period. Furthermore we observe that there is a strong correlation between the number of failure events and energy wasted measured at 0.645 on the Pearson scale.
Servers experience on average 1.63 failure events, with a standard deviation of 2.68. This observation indicates that the majority of them share a similar probability of failure. There are a few exceptions to this however; 26 servers experienced 10 or more failures, with the highest number of server failure events at 165. In broader terms, the top 10 servers represent 0.2% of total failed servers and contribute 7.17% of total server failure events, and subsequently compose 5% of the total tasks failed due to server failures. This observation contrasts from existing work in [14] that observed that a small minority of the nodes incurred a larger proportion of failures at 70%. Fig. 14(a) shows that a total of 3006 tasks failed due to server failures in the nine servers with the most failure events. It can be observed that server 7, which experiences 13 failure events, contains the lowest proportion of task failures as well as total energy waste as shown in Fig. 14(b) . We postulate that although the server is logged by the system as recovered, it still exhibits incorrect service.
This behavior does reduce system availability, but it does not result in significant impact to energy waste. On the other hand, server 2 experiences 23 failure events and results in a larger proportion of energy wasted at 32 KWatts-Hours. This is a result of a larger temporal distance between failures resulting in tasks able to perform longer execution times before failure. In addition, it is observed that priority 9 tasks which compose a small proportion of the total scheduled tasks represent a significant proportion of energy wasted due to server failure across all server types. We can observe from this behavior that a small proportion of tasks with high priority result in a high waste of energy consumption due to server failures.
IX. ENERGY WASTE IMPACT ON THE SYSTEM
From Fig. 15(a) and (b) , it is possible to observe that although in general terms tasks with priority 0 are the most affected by FAIL events in up to 80% of the cases, this value is inflated by very few days in which its proportion is extremely high in comparison to other days. This is clearly produced by the activity of specific users presented in Fig. 13 that not only submit a large number of tasks, but also introduce a large number of resubmissions of tasks that repeatedly fail as a result of crash-loops. Without the influence of those users, the number of events and energy waste produced by fails on Priority 0 is very similar to the other days, even lower than Priority 9 that proportionally produce more energy waste.
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Filtering the proportion of EVICT and KILL events that relate to server failures, task and server failures contribute 13% and 8% of the total TE energy waste, respectively. This energy waste translates to 9.91% and 6.10% in the context of the total energy consumption for the entire datacenter. As observed in Fig. 16 , this is a substantial amount of energy waste in large-scale environments and represents an important point of improvement that can lead to reducing operational costs while the provisioned QoS is maintained.
By minimizing the impact of server failures on long running tasks it is possible to reduce energy waste by as much as 8%. In this context, mechanisms such as those presented in [5] for checkpointing can be applied in order to maintain the progress of long running tasks and avoid repeated computation. However, in the case of task FAIL events, checkpointing can increase the waste of resources due to the high frequency of failure occurrence and the low priority of the majority of tasks affected. In this case, improved policies to avoid highly recurrent resubmissions such as those described in [4] can reduce the proportion of TE energy waste by up to 13%.
From the presented analysis it is clear that the negative effect of failures on the energy waste for the studied environment is produced in two well defined scenarios. The first VOLUME 2, NO. 2, JUNE 2014 one involves task FAIL events that affect low priority tasks 80% of the time with a MTBF of 0.97 hours. Moreover, it is mainly driven by top 10 users which produce close to the 90% of FAIL events due to crash-loops, especially during days 2 and 10. The second scenario involves EVICT and KILL events produced by server failures, affecting 30% of tasks with high priority tasks with a MTBF of 58.72 hours. This scenario is driven by hardware and software failures of servers uniformly distributed according to the size of their population. That is, not one server type is affecting other types in proportion to the number of its available servers during the observation period.
X. APPLICATION OF WORK
Although the results obtained in this analysis are specific to the studied environment, the findings in this work can be used as a baseline of analysis for similar practical systems. Researchers and practitioners can use the derived observations and conclusions to develop, enhance and evaluate energy-aware dependable mechanisms as well as identify specific scenarios when and where failures have a significant impact on the energy waste within the system.
To give a practical example, failure-aware scheduling [35] , [36] focuses on developing more effective resource management to increase task reliability and system availability. Current techniques focus on improving the availability, reliability and performance of the system and do not consider energy-efficiency. As shown in Fig. 3 , it is observable that different server platforms exhibit different energy profiles at the same system load, which can result in failure-aware algorithms scheduling tasks and jobs onto energy-inefficient servers as they only consider the server capacity. As a result, it is possible to develop a failure-aware scheduling algorithm that select servers that provide a balance between ideal server reliability and energy-efficiency for executing a task. The work presented within this study can be leveraged in order to evaluate the effectiveness of such a mechanism and quantify the improvements in energy-efficiency based on empirical data as opposed to relying on theoretical values for energywaste of software and hardware in large-scale systems.
Additionally, the findings presented in this work can be used in following ways:
• To support and adjust the claims of failure energyaware mechanisms according to the characteristics of a real environment. Although the existing theoretical analyses remark that significant energy waste is produced by failures and propose elaborated mechanisms to address this problem, they do not present or discuss any insight into the actual amount of energy waste based on empirical findings. In fact, they never contrast the claimed improvements against quantified waste in real operational scenarios.
• To assist practitioners from similar environments to decide the appropriate dependability mechanisms and when to apply them in order to maximize the expected effectiveness. Failures within large-scale systems are the norm, rather than the exception. As a result, Cloud providers need to decide what type of faults they should invest time and resources in correcting when considering their system impact in terms of QoS, energy waste and development cost. For example, the work in [12] states that there are a number of limitations in applying faulttolerant run-time techniques such as checkpointing, as they can potentially not only introduce high overhead, but more importantly difficulty in deciding when and where to apply such mechanisms. The results presented in this work provide quantified dimensions for Cloud failures and energy waste which can be leveraged when making decisions to deploy a mechanism such as checkpointing, as well as on what type of workload.
• To delimitate the energy waste produced by the ''normal'' operational inefficiencies and those introduced by task and server failures. Understanding the sources and dimensions of these inefficiencies helps to identify the most effective courses of action to reduce their negative impact. From the studied environment it is noticeable that although failures introduce close to the 21% of the total energy waste, this is still lower than the 79% introduced by scheduling operations such as KILL and EVICT. Such findings are critical in future research areas which aim to realistically model large-scale system environments [38] .
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented and discussed the results of the first failure analysis on a large-scale heterogeneous Cloud environment that also quantifies the impact of task and server failures in matters of energy consumption. These results demonstrate that re-submissions caused by task and server crash failures create a signifcant amount of wasted computation that results in 21% of the total energy waste for ''Termination Events'' (TEs) within the analyzed trace log. Additionally, the results also expose the existance of two main scenarios where failures lead to energy waste. The first is related to task failures frequently occuring on low priority tasks after a short MTBF and comprising 13% of the total enegy waste by TEs. The second is related to server failures that seldomly occur and affect high priority tasks after a long MTBF and comprises 8% of the total waste accounted by TEs. From these results a number of observations and important conclusions can be made:
• Energy waste can be produced by failures under very different conditions creating well defined scenarios depending on the system characteristics and user patterns. For the analyzed environment it is observed that the influence of very few users and the priority schema implemented by the scheduler affects the energy waste in the datacenter significantly.
• Analyzing the impact of failures in energy consumption is critical to select the most appropriate mechanisms to reduce the waste while QoS is maintained. Depending on the characteristics of a scenario the introduction of
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inappropriate mechanisms may actually increase the waste rather than reduce it, for example the use of failure-aware scheduling and migration for highly frequent failures on low priority tasks.
• Temporal and spatial failure analysis can assist in determining the most important factor that contributes to the produced energy waste. For the analyzed environment, the tasks' elapsed time has a decisive impact on the amount of generated waste. However, depending on the different energy profiles of the servers in the datacenter, the location of the tasks also plays an important role.
• Filtering the failures from the general TEs in the data center can lead to establish points of improvement to reduce the energy wasted not only by failures but also by the ''normal'' system operational characteristics. In the analyzed environment, after failure filtering, EVICT and KILL events from the normal scheduling operation still account for 35% and 44% of energy waste, respectively. As future work we plan to model the failure characteristics observed in this paper to enhance energy-aware mechanisms and evaluate them considering parameters from realistic environments using our approach for workload modeling and simulation in [37] . This is critical since current approaches have not presented fair comparison parameters in real production environments. Additionally, we are planning to analyze further the failure characteristics within the system. For example, we have observed that a small proportion of the failure events analyzed within the trace log are caused by abnormally high rates of CPU and Memory utilization. Finally, it is also important to design and implement mechanisms such as scheduling policies and faulttolerant strategies that can dynamically adapt to the different energy-failure scenarios which exist under real operational conditions.
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